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MoRTGAGEs-PRIORITIEs-MECHANICs' LIEN ATIACHING TO OPTioNEE's 
INTEREST IN LAND SUPERIOR TO PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE-The holder 
of an option to purchase land ordered building materials from plaintiff. 
The materials were delivered the same day. The option was subsequently 
exercised by the vendee, and a warranty deed received from the vendor. 
At the same time a deed of trust was executed and delivered by the vendee · 
to the defendant to secure a loan for the purchase money. The trust deed 
was properly recorded. Upon a failure of payment, plaintiff filed its 
mechanic's lien. Defendant subsequently foreclosed its trust deed. Plain-
tiff commenced this action to foreclose its lien. The trial court held the 
mechanic's lien superior to the trust deed. On appeal, held, affirmed.1 An 
optionee is the "owner" of property within the meaning of the statute;2 the 
mechanic's lien attaches when the materials are first delivered and there is 
no exception, in the case of a purchase money mortgage, to the statutory 
language giving mechanics' liens priority over other subsequent encum-
brances.a Sontag v. Abbott, (Colo. 1959) 344 P. (2d) 961. 
In most jurisdictions a purchase money mortgage, given as part of the 
same transaction which brought the deed to the mortgagor, is superior to 
a mechanic's lien regardless of whether such a lien attaches prior to or sub-
sequent to the delivery of the deed.4 Generally the rationale employed 
to reach this result is that the vendee is but momentarily seised of the fee, 
and that during this brief period no lien could attach before the fee is 
conveyed to the mortgagee by the execution and delivery of the mortgage.I> 
1 Two other materialmen were joined as defendants and the court affirmed the trial 
court's judgment that their liens were entitled to priority over plaintiff's purchase money 
mortgage. Although not absolutely clear, it appears from the opinion that the "labor and 
materials furnished by them in erecting improvements" were furnished after the trust 
deed was recorded. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §86-3-6 gives priority to mechanics' liens 
only as to subsequent encumbrances. It is, under these circumstances, difficult to justify 
the holding of the court as to these parties. 
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann (1953) §86-3-1. 
8 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §86-3-6: "All liens established by virtue of this article 
••• shall have priority over any and every lien or encumbrance subsequently interven-
ing •..• " 
4Bard Constr. Co. v. Wandner Co., 12 N.J. Super. 118, 79 A. (2d) 54 (1951); Queal 
Lbr. Co. v. McNeal, 226 Iowa 637, 284 N.W. 482 (1939); Larson Real Property Co. v. 
Norris-Lyddon Produce Co., 127 Neb. 357, 255 N.W. 50 (1934); Shilowitz v. Wadler, 237 
App. Div. 330, 261 N.Y .S. 351 (1932); Bridgeport Peoples Sav. Bank v. Palaia, 115 Conn. 
357, 161 A. 526 (1932); Pacific Spruce Co. v. Oregon Portland Cement Co., 133 Ore. 223, 
286 P. 520 (1930); Bond v. Westine, 128 Kan. 370, 278 P. 12 (1929). See authorities cited 
in notes 5, 7, 8 infra; WALSH, MORTGAGES §38 (1934); I JONES, MORTGAGES, 8th ed., §§586-
588 (1928); 72 A.L.R. 1516 (1931); comment, 29 VA. L. R.Ev. 491 at 496 (1943); Eastin, 
"Priorities Between Mortgages and Mechanics' Liens," 48 LAw SER. UNIV. Mo. BUL. 5 
(1935); comment, 36 YALE L.J. 129 at 133-134 (1926); note, 30 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1917). 
Contra: Credit Finance Corp. v. Hale &: Perry, (10th Cir. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 357; Highland 
Lbr. Co. v. Young, (La. App. 1948) 38 S. (2d) 638; Merritt v. Dansmith Corp., 240 App. 
Div. 338,270 N.Y.S. 675 (1934); Thomas v. Setliffe, 160 Tenn. 689, 28 S.W. (2d) 344 (1930); 
Ansley v. Pasahro, 22 Neb. 662, 35 N.W. 885 (1888). 
6 Smith Builders Supply, Inc. v. Rivenbark, 231 N.C. 213, 56 S.E. (2d) 431 (1949); 
Green v. Saxton, 196 Iowa 1086, 196 N.W. 27 (1923); N.H. Sav. Bank v. Varner, (8th Cir. 
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This theory, however, will not serve in lien states where the title remains in 
the grantee-mortgagor.6 In these states two theories have been advanced to 
give preference to the purchase money mortgage. The first is that the mort-
gage is merely a continuation in changed form of the vendor's common law 
lien for the purchase price and since the vendor's lien would be prior, the 
mortgage, when executed, enjoys the same priority.7 The second view is 
that the title comes to the grantee already burdened with the mortgage;8 
thus a mechanic's lien attaching to this interest would be attaching to an 
already encumbered interest. Applying this to the principal case, the 
mechanic's lien would be superior insofar as it attaches to the optionee's 
equitable property interest9 but would be inferior to the purchase money 
mortgage with respect to the fee.1° The holding of the principal case that 
one who has an option to purchase land may be considered the "owner"ll 
thereof is supported by many cases.12 An optionee therefore would meet 
the ownership requirement which is a prerequisite to subjecting the prop-
erty to a mechanic's lien. The question of when the lien attaches varies 
greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending upon the statute and 
its interpretation.1 3 There is no theoretical objection to a rule, such 
1914) 216 F. 721, affd. 240 U.S. 617 (1916); Rochford v. Rochford, 188 Mass. 108, 74 N.E. 
299 (1905); Hillhouse v. Pratt, 74 Conn. 113, 49 A. 905 (1901); Birmingham Bldg. &: Loan 
Assn. v. Boggs, 116 Ala. 587, 22 S. 852 (1897); N.J. Bldg. Co. v. Bachelor, 54 N.J. Eq. 600, 
35 A. 745 (1896); Russell v. Grant, 122 Mo. 161, 26 S.W. 958 (1894); Tritch v. Norton, 10 
Colo. 337, 15 P. 680 (1887); Stewart v. Smith, 36 Minn. 82, 30 N.W. 430 (1886); Virgin v. 
Brubaker, 4 Nev. 31 (1868); In re Campbell's Appeal, 36 Pa. St. 247 (1860); Guy v. Carr-
irere, 5 Cal. 511 (1855). See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §213, p. 558 (1951). 
6 In Colorado a mortgage is deemed a lien, not a conveyance. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. (1953) §118-6-17. 
7Reed &: Sherwood Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 202 Minn. 274, 278 N.W. 30 (1938); Moody v. 
Tschabald, 52 Minn. 51, 53 N.W. 1023 (1892); Thrope Bros. v. Durban, 45 Iowa 192 (1876). 
s Sisemore v. Voelke, (Okla. 1957) 312 P. (2d) 922; Joplin Cement Co. v. Greene 
County Bldg. &: Loan Assn., 228 Mo. App. 883, 74 S.W. (2d) 250 (1934); Prichard Bros. v. 
Causey, 158 Tenn. 53, 12 S.W. (2d) 711 (1929); Coiner v. Bede, 11 Ohio App. 137 (1919); 
Wilson v. Lubke, 176 Mo. 210, 75 S.W. 602 (1903); Oliver v. Davy, 34 Minn. 292, 25 N.W. 
629 (1886). See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §213, p. 559 (1951). 
o An optionee's interest in the land may be likened to that of a vendee under a land 
sale contract where the vendor has not yet conveyed title. Both may get specific perform-
ance of their agreement in a court of equity. 
10 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §86-3-3 provides that the lien "shall extend to and 
embrace any additional or greater interest ... acquired by such owner at any time .... " 
Thus when the grantee-mortgagor receives the title to the property this inures to the 
benefit of the lien. However, under the analysis presented, the title comes to the grantee-
mortgagor already burdened with the purchase money mortgage and it is only this encum-
bered fee which inures to the benefit of the lien. 
111 CORBIN, CONTRACI'S §272 (1950); 2 id., §418; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 
§307 (1939). See London &: S.W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. Div. 562 (1882). Cf. Albert S. 
Eastwood Lbr. Co. v. Britto, 51 R.I. 406, 155 A. 354 (1931). 
12 See 2 AL.R. 778 at 794 (1919); 95 A.L.R. 1085 at 1095 (1935). Contra: Hayward 
Lbr. &: Invest. Co. v. Starley, 124 Cal. App. 283, 12 P. (2d) 66 (1932); Martin-Welch Hard-
ware &: Plumbing Co. v. Moor, (Mo. App. 1929) 16 S.W. (2d) 667. 
13 OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §214, p. 567 (1951). See 1928 HANDBOOK OF COMMI~IONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 495; 4 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY §16.106F (1952). Most often 
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as that adopted in the principal case,14 that the lien attaches at the moment 
of delivery of the materials to the real estate.u; Since the mechanics' lien 
is strictly a creature of statute, it is difficult to make meaningful generaliza-
tions based on the decided cases without considering the statute under 
which the decision was made. Although the language of the Colorado 
statute16 gives the court a solid basis for its decision, there are other fac-
tors which should be considered. To deny to the purchase money mort-
gagee priority over other claimants may well undermine the very security 
upon which he relied. Without the advance made by the money-lending 
mortgagee, vendees often would be unable to acquire the property at all. 
Had this been the situation in the principal case, plaintiff's mechanic's 
lien would have attached only to the mortgagor's equitable interest.I 1 The 
theory that the fee came to the mortgagor already encumbered18 is not 
seriously affected by the fact that the mortgage in the principal case was 
given to a third party.19 Such a series of events has been held to be one 
continuous plan, the instruments being interpreted as a contemporaneous 
operation in order to promote the intent of all the parties.20 Thus in the 
principal case the court could have given the mortgage priority, even with 
the statutory language present, by finding the fee, when acquired, was 
already encumbered.21 Although mechanics' liens . are generally favored 
over all other claims,22 there is no compelling reason to do so in a situa-
tion such as the principal case presents.23 Such a decision may seriously 
interfere with land sale transactions by putting prospective vendors in fear 
used are (1) the commencement of the building, meaning in some places the actual start 
of physical work, while in others the mere piling of materials so that they may be seen, 
and (2) the commencement of the services or fl,lrnishing of materials. 
14 See principal case at 964. 
15 See note 13 supra. 
16 See note 3 supra. 
17 See note 9 supra. 
18 See note 8 supra. 
10 The fact that the mortgage is given to a person other than the grantor who supplies 
the funds with which the purchase price is paid does not affect the mortgage's character 
as being a purchase money mortgage. Smith Builders Supply, Inc. v. Rivenbark, note 5 
supra; Joseph v. Donovan, 116 Conn. 160, 164 A. 498 (1933); Protestant Episcopal Church 
v. Lowe Co., 131 Ga. 666, 63 S.E. 136 (1908); N.J. Bldg. Co. v. Bachelor, note 5 supra; 
Laidley v. Aikin, 80 Iowa 112, 45 N.W. 384 (1890); Stewart v. Smith, note 5 supra. See 
OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §213, p. 555 (1951). 
20 See Stewart v. Smith, note 5 supra. 
21 Some jurisdictions have attempted to divide the priorities so as to give the purchase 
money mortgage priority as to the land and the mechanic's lien priority as to the improve-
ment. This would appear to be an equitable solution since there is no reason to give the 
mortgagee additional security, on which he did not rely, at the expense of the materialman. 
However, there are practical problems, such as the severability of the improvement from 
the land, which must be considered in the application of the statute to any given fact 
situation. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §215, pp. 571-572 (1951). 
22 See 10 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §5186, pp. 270-271 (1957). 
23 See Credit Finance Corp. v. Hale & Perry, note 4 supra; OSBORNE, MoRTGAGES §213, 
p. 561 _(1951). 
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of giving options to purchase land, lest they be faced with the additional 
burden of searching the land to be sure that the optionee has not com-
menced building operations prior to the exercise of the option. It seems 
more reasonable that materialmen be required to ascertain the correct state 
of title to property before deliveries are started and to refrain from making 
deliveries if they do not want to have a contemplated purchase money 
mortgage given priority.24 
Roger W. Kapp 
24 It may be proper to distinguish between the purchase money mortgage to the 
vendor and the purchase money mortgage to a third-party money lender. It does not 
appear so unreasonable to require the third-party money lender to bear the burden of 
searching the premises since ordinarily he is in the business of money lending. 
